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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between an integrated corporate governance (CG) 
index and financial performance using a sample of 169 South African (SA) listed 
corporations between 2002 and 2007. We find a statistically significant and positive 
association between a broad set of good CG practices and financial performance. In a 
series of sensitivity analyses, we find that our results are robust to endogeneity, different 
financial performance proxies, alternative CG weighting scheme and firm-level fixed-
effects. We further distinctively examine the link between complying with SA context 
specific stakeholder CG provisions and financial performance. In line with political cost 
and resource dependence theories, our results reveal a statistically significant and positive 
nexus between compliance with stakeholder CG provisions and financial performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between a set of an integrated good 
corporate governance (CG) practices and the financial performance of companies listed on the 
South African (SA) Stock Exchange (the JSE). Specifically, we examine whether better-governed 
SA public corporations generate higher financial performance, and whether compliance with SA 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions does impact on the financial 
performance of JSE listed companies. Theoretically, a reduction in agency costs associated with 
good governance may affect corporate financial performance (Davidson, 1995, 1998; Ntim et al., 
2011b). First, good governance reduces monitoring and bonding costs, such as auditing (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2011b). Second, good governance makes investors optimistic 
about future cash flows (Jensen, 1986; Ntim et al., 2011a). Investors bid-up share prices because 
with better governance, they are likely to receive a greater proportion of their firms‟ profits 
instead of being expropriated by mangers (La Porta et al., 2002; Beiner et al., 2006). Finally, and 
as equity values appreciate, the cost of outside capital and/or risk tend to fall (Black et al., 2006a; 
Chen et al., 2009), and thereby improving corporate performance. 
 Generally, recent evidence offers empirical support for the theory that good governance is 
priced by stock markets. Beiner et al. (2006), Black et al. (2006a), Cheung et al. (2007) and 
Henry (2008) report positive relationship between a broad set of CG ratings and firm financial 
performance for a sample of Swiss, Hong Kong, Korean and Australian listed corporations, 
respectively. Similarly, cross-country studies by Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim 
(2005) and Morey et al. (2009) show a positive association between a set of an integrated good 
CG practices and corporate financial performance. 
 A major issue of interest is that prior studies on the link between integrated CG indices 
and financial performance have been so far concentrated mainly on the developed and emerging 
stock markets of America, Asia-Pacific and Europe (Beiner et al. 2006, Black et al. 2006a and b; 
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Cheung et al., 2007; and Henry, 2008). Within the African context, a number of previous studies 
have examined the effect of individual CG mechanisms on corporate performance (e.g., 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006; Kyereboah-Coleman et al., 2006; Kyereboah-Coleman, 
2007; Sunday, 2008; Sanda et al., 2010; Ntim and Osei, 2011). By contrast, and largely due to 
data limitations, evidence on the effect of an integrated CG index on corporate performance in 
Africa is virtually non-existent (Okeahalam, 2004; Barako et al., 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 
2008; Ntim et al., 2011a). However, some African countries, and in particular, SA arguably offer 
an interesting research context, where the association between an integrated set of good CG 
ratings and corporate performance can be investigated. 
On the one hand, and unlike most African countries, SA possesses a relatively sound 
financial and regulatory structure reminiscent of developed markets, such as UK and US. For 
example, and like the UK (see Mallin, 2006, pp.3 to 9 for a quick review of how CG has evolved 
in the UK), CG seems to be fluidly developing. As will be explained further below, a formal code 
of CG was first introduced in 1994 (King I), and revised in 2002 (King II). To achieve greater 
supervision and monitoring, rigorous insider trading law and listing rules have been introduced, 
and enforcement is being strengthened (Insider Trading Act 1998; JSE Listing Rules, 2007). Also, 
and in contrast to most African countries, SA has deep equity culture comparable with those of 
other emerging and developed economies (Deutsche Bank, 2002; Malherbe and Segal, 2003). For 
instance, market capitalisation to GDP ratio in 2007 for SA was 293%, and this compares with 
139% and 113% for the UK and US (WFE, 2011), respectively.  
On the other hand, and as will be discussed further below, the SA corporate landscape 
depicts significant differences with the UK corporate environment. However, like most 
developing Commonwealth countries, CG principles have mainly been borrowed from the UK. 
This brings into question as to the applicability of some of these CG mechanisms to the SA 
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corporate context. It also implies that the relationship between integrated CG ratings and 
corporate performance may be different from what has been reported for UK listed corporations.  
For example, and as will be explained further in section 2, while the SA CG model is 
predominantly Anglo-American (shareholding), King II formally imposes substantial affirmative 
action and stakeholder demands (stakeholding) on listed corporations to comply with. This raises 
the crucial policy question of whether the current SA CG framework is sufficiently robust to 
effectively pursue the contrasting agenda of maximising shareholder returns and providing a 
meaningful protection of the interests of a larger stakeholder group (Kakabadse and Korac-
Kakabadse, 2002; West, 2006, 2009). Similarly, as an emerging market, ownership of firms is 
relatively concentrated (Barr et al. 1995; Ntim, 2009). By contrast, UK corporations have 
relatively dispersed ownership structure. This implies that unlike the UK, the market for 
managerial and corporate control through which non-performing managers and companies are 
expected to be disciplined may not be effective in SA (Barr et al., 1995; Ntim et al., 2011a).   
Also, while SA dominates African continental market capitalisation (over 70%) (WFE, 
2011), it is considerably smaller compared with the UK. Specifically, it has fewer numbers of 
listed corporations, lower liquidity, and smaller, but concentrated market capitalisation in relation 
to the UK (WFE, 2011). This implies that the impact of conventional UK-style CG mechanisms 
on the financial performance of SA listed companies may be different from UK listed 
corporations. Finally, and different from most African countries, SA is home to some of the 
world‟s largest multinationals, which attract substantial foreign direct investments, mainly from 
large UK and US institutional investors (Armstrong et al., 2006; Forbes, 2011). This means that 
unlike most African countries, any CG failures may have serious implications far beyond SA and 
Africa. We contend that the rich research context in terms of similarities and differences with the 
UK, in addition to the dearth of prior studies serve as a strong motivation to examine the effect of 
an integrated CG index on corporate financial performance. 
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This paper makes a number of contributions. First, using CG data collected from annual 
reports, we construct an integrated CG index for a sample of 169 SA listed corporations from 
2002 to 2007. Our index consists of 50 CG provisions based on the 2002 King Code (King II) for 
SA corporations. Second, we provide evidence on the association between an integrated CG 
index and financial performance for SA listed corporations. This also extends the international 
evidence to SA corporate context. Finally, and distinct from prior studies, we offer evidence on 
how compliance with SA context specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions 
affect the financial performance of SA listed corporations.  
Our results show a statistically significant and positive association between our integrated 
CG index and corporate financial performance. This implies that SA listed corporations with 
better CG standards tend to be associated with higher financial performance. In a series of 
sensitivity analyses, we find that our evidence is robust to: (1) endogeneity; (2) market or 
accounting based financial performance proxies; (3) alternative CG index weighting scheme; and 
(4) firm-level fixed-effects. Also, and consistent with political cost and resource dependence 
theories, we find a statistically significant and positive association between compliance with SA 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions and financial performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
South African CG model. Section 3 reviews the prior literature on the link between integrated CG 
indices and financial performance. Section 4 describes the data and research methodology. 
Section 5 reports empirical results. Section 6 presents robustness, while section 7 concludes. 
 
2. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 
South Africa (SA) was the first developing country to introduce a corporate governance (CG) 
code in the form of the 1994 King Report (Mallin, 2006, 2007; Ntim et al., 2011a). The 
recommendations of the 1994 King Report (hereafter King I) were heavily informed by those of 
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the UK‟s Cadbury Report of 1992 (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim and Osei, 2011). For 
example, and in line with the Cadbury Report, King I adopted an Anglo-American style unitary 
board of directors, consisting of executive and non-executive directors (NEDs), who are 
primarily accountable to shareholders. Also, SA corporations were required to split the roles of 
chairman and CEO, set-up audit and remuneration committees with at least two non-executive 
directors as board members. Similar to the Cadbury Report, King I was appended to the JSE 
listing rules with a voluntary (comply or explain) compliance regime.  
King I was reviewed in 2002 following important domestic (legislation, such as the 
Employment Equity Act, 1998) and international (new Codes, like the UK Combined Code, 1998) 
developments. A major distinguishing feature of the 2002 King Report (hereafter King II) from 
other Anglo-American CG Codes is that it adopted the „inclusive‟ approach to CG (West, 2006, 
2009). That is, while King II maintains and strengthens the Anglo-American (shareholding) 
features (like voluntary compliance regime, unitary board, and majority NEDs), substantial SA 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholder demands (stakeholding), aimed at addressing 
the lingering negative social and economic legacies of Apartheid are „formally‟ superimposed on 
listed firms to comply with. They include employment equity (EE), black economic 
empowerment (BEE), environment and HIV/Aids. 
This compels SA corporations to depict some of the key characteristics of both the 
„shareholding‟ (Anglo-American) and „stakeholding‟ (Continental European-Asian) models of 
CG. This makes the SA CG model a „hybrid‟ or unique within the Anglo-American world 
(Mallin, 2006, 2007; Andreason, 2009). Critics of King II (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 
2002; Spisto, 2005), however, argue that it is inappropriate to explicitly superimpose affirmative 
action and stakeholder demands on a CG model that has a predominantly „shareholding‟ 
orientation. We, therefore, seek to empirically examine the relationship between a broad set of 
CG index and corporate financial performance within such an interesting context. 
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3. PRIOR LITERATURE: AN INTEGRATED CG INDICES AND PERFORMANCE 
 A number of papers have investigated the association between integrated CG indices and 
corporate financial performance. For example, Gompers et al. (2003), Cremers and Nair (2005), 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), and Bebchuk et al. (2009) have examined the nexus between 
broad composite CG indices and corporate performance for a sample of US corporations. The 
results of these studies generally suggest that better-governed US corporations tend to be 
associated with higher financial performance. 
 In the larger continental Europe, due to limited availability of sufficient CG data, very 
little research has been done that studies the relationship between a broad set of CG indices and 
corporate financial performance. Baur et al. (2004), Drobetz at al. (2004), Beiner et al. (2006) 
and Bauwhede (2009) are rare exceptions. Using a cross-sectional sample of 109 Swiss listed 
corporations, for example, Beiner et al. (2006) study the link between an integrated CG index 
based on 38 provisions from the 2002 Swiss Code of Best Practice and corporate financial 
performance, as measured by Tobin‟s Q. In line with the results of prior US and European studies 
(Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al. 2004), they report a positive association between a broad set 
of good CG ratings and corporate financial performance. 
 Other studies have been conducted in the established emerging markets of America, Asia-
Pacific and Europe. For example, Black (2001), Baek et al. (2004), Black et al. (2006a and b), 
Black and Khanna (2007), Cheung et al. (2007), and Garay and González (2008) have 
investigated the link between a broad composite CG index and financial performance, using a 
sample of Russian, South Korean, Indian, Hong Kong and Venezuelan listed corporations, 
respectively. The results of these studies also offer empirical support to the positive nexus 
between integrated CG indices and corporate performance reported for developed markets. 
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 A conspicuous gap within the extant literature is the dearth of evidence regarding African 
stock markets (Okeahalam, 2004; Barako et al., 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim et al., 
2011a)
2
. However, and as has already been explained, some African countries, such as SA 
arguably offer interesting research context. The only evidence regarding African stock markets 
are cross-country studies by Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), and Morey et al. 
(2009). Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005), for instance, have used Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia’s (CLSA) 2000 analysts‟ CG ratings to examine the association between 
a broad set of CG ratings and corporate performance in a sample of emerging markets that 
include SA. The results of these studies indicate that, on average, better-governed corporations 
tend to be associated with higher corporate financial performance. 
However, these cross-country studies appear to suffer from a number of problems. First, 
they make use of analysts‟ CG ratings. A major problem with analysts‟ CG rankings is that they 
are based purely on analysts‟ perceptions of CG quality rather than on a direct examination of 
company annual reports (Beattie et al., 2004). Their findings may be considered to be of limited 
evidential value. Crucially, prior research suggests that analysts‟ CG ratings tend to be biased 
towards large corporations (Botosan, 1997; Ntim, 2009). The CLSA (2000) CG rankings that has 
mainly been used by prior studies, for example, includes only 9 of the largest SA listed 
corporations. Arguably, this limits the generalisation of their findings for SA listed corporations.  
Second, the extant literature suggests that CG structures and systems vary across different 
countries (West, 2006, 2009). However, analysts‟ CG rankings are standardised such that they are 
unable to reflect institutional, cultural, and contextual differences in CG structures across 
individual countries and systems. This implies that they are unable to assess how compliance 
                                                 
2
To the best of our knowledge, the only exception is Ntim et al. (2011b), which investigates the relative value 
relevance of shareholder versus stakeholder CG disclosures for SA listed corporations. Their results suggest that 
investors value shareholder related CG disclosures more highly than their stakeholder counterparts. This paper seeks 
to extend Ntim et al.‟s study to focus on the direct links between an integrated CG index and financial performance.  
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with SA context specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG issues impact on the financial 
performance of SA listed corporations. Finally, despite increasing concerns that the presence of 
endogenous problems can confound research findings (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), with the 
exception of Durnev and Kim (2005), prior cross-country studies that include SA do not 
explicitly address potential problems that may be caused by the existence of an endogenous 
relationship between integrated CG indices and corporate performance. This also brings into 
doubt the reliability of the results of these prior cross-country studies that include SA. 
 The current study on SA attempts to overcome these limitations in prior studies in several 
ways. First, we use the entire useable sample of 169 SA listed corporations over the 2002-2007 
period. Distinct from past studies, this allows us to capture the effects of both cross-sectional and 
time series changes in CG index on corporate performance, as well as improve the generalisation 
of the results. Second, we construct SA CG index (CGI) based on the CG provisions of King II. 
Unlike subjective analysts‟ rankings, it has the advantage of ensuring that unique SA contextual 
CG provisions, such as employment equity and HIV/Aids are incorporated into the methodology. 
Finally, to improve the reliability of the results, problems that may be posed by the presence of 
endogeneities, including firm-level fixed-effects are explicitly addressed.    
 
4. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Data: sample selection, sources, and description 
In examining the association between our integrated CG index and corporate financial 
performance, we target all 291
3
 non-financial corporations listed on the JSE as at 31/12/2007. We 
use CG and financial performance data to investigate the link between our broad set of CG 
ratings and corporate performance. All the CG variables were manually extracted from the annual 
                                                 
3
For regulatory and capital structure reasons, as well as following prior studies (Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009), 
financial and utilities industries with 111 firms were excluded. This leaves us with 291 corporations from 8 
industries to be sampled. The industrial breakdown is as follows: basic materials with 67 firms; consumer goods with 
36 firms; consumer services with 62 firms; health care with 7 firms; industrials with 81 firms; oil & gas with 3; 
telecommunications with 4 firms; and technology with 31 firms. 
 9 
 
 
reports of the sampled companies. The annual reports were mainly obtained from the Perfect 
Information Database (PID) in electronic format. Since we were interested in examining the 
relationship between our integrated set of CG practices and corporate financial performance over 
time, we focused on companies with the full CG and financial data required over the whole 
sample period (i.e., 2002 to 2007)
4
 available in the PID and DataStream, respectively. We 
obtained the full data required for a total of 169
5
 out of the 291 corporations over the sample 
period for our regression analysis.  
 
4.2. Research methodology:  definition of variables and model specification 
The constructed broad SA CG index (CGI) is the main independent variable used in 
investigating the association between CG and corporate performance. The CGI is an aggregation 
of 50 comprehensive set CG provisions contained in King II. The CGI is constructed based on 
the 5 broad sections of King II covering: (1) boards, directors and ownership; (2) accounting and 
auditing; (3) risk management, internal audit and control; (4) integrated sustainability reporting; 
and (5) compliance and enforcement. All companies listed on the JSE are required to comply 
with the CG provisions or give reasons for non-compliance. The Appendix contains the 5 broad 
sections and the various variables that make-up the CGI.  
 Our CGI is distinct from those of prior research. First, unlike previous studies that focus 
on specific aspects of CG in isolation, for instance, shareholder rights (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Cremers and Nair, 2005), and board size (Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009), but similar to Beiner et 
al. (2006), it covers all aspects of CG. This allows for the existence of potential interdependences 
among alternative CG mechanisms. Second, in line with prior studies (Black et al., 2006a and b), 
                                                 
4
The sample begins from 2002 because data coverage in the PID and DataStream for our sample is limited until that 
year, and also it is the year King II became operational. It ends in 2007 because it is the most recent year for which 
data is available. 
5
The industrial breakdown of our final sample is as follows: basic materials  and 0il & gas with 34 firms; consumer 
goods with 24 firms; consumer services and health care with 38 firms; industrials with 51 firms; and technology & 
telecommunications with 22 firms. 
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our CGI covers conventional CG issues, such as board and ownership, but distinct from past 
studies (Klapper and Love, 2004; Morey et al. 2009), it covers SA context specific affirmative 
action and stakeholder CG provisions (a sub-index defined as SCGI that contains 9 provisions of 
the CGI will be formed, see section 5 of the Appendix), like employment equity and HIV/Aids.  
The construction of the CGI is simple – we award a value of „1‟ if any of the 50 CG 
provisions of King II covering the 5 sections in the Appendix is disclosed in an annual report or 
„0‟ otherwise. With this scoring scheme, a company‟s total score in a particular firm year can 
vary between zero (0%) to fifty (100%), with better-governed firms having higher index levels.  
Our measure of corporate financial performance is the widely used Tobin‟s Q (Q), but to 
check the robustness of our results, we use return on assets (ROA) and total share returns (TSR), 
as alternative accounting and market based performance measures, respectively. To minimise 
potential omitted variables bias, we include a number of control variables.  First, corporations 
with higher investment opportunities tend to grow relatively faster (Durnev and Kim, 2005). 
Theoretically, faster growing corporations may generate higher performance (Klapper and Love, 
2004). Also, corporations with greater growth opportunities will need to raise external capital, 
and may need to adopt better CG to attract capital (Beiner et al., 2006). Following prior literature 
(Henry, 2008), a positive Q-growth opportunities (GROWTH) link is hypothesised.  
Second, corporations with higher investment in innovation and technology may gain 
competitive advantage by launching new products and services (Brown et al., 2009). This may 
help them to receive premium prices and generate higher Q (Jermias, 2007). By contrast, 
innovation is capital intensive (Weir et al., 2002), and as such may impact negatively on current 
Q. In line with past research (Black et al., 2006b), capital expenditure (CAPEX) is predicted to 
correlate significantly with Q, without specifying the direction of the coefficient. Third, from an 
agency perspective, Jensen (1986) suggests that higher levels of gearing can increase 
performance by reducing agency conflicts associated with having „excess cash flows‟ by 
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opportunistic managers. In contrast, the costs of financial distress that are usually associated with 
higher levels of gearing may inhibit a company‟s ability to pursue profitable investment 
opportunities (Jensen, 1986). Similar to past CG research (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), gearing is 
controlled for. However, given the mixed evidence, gearing (GEAR) is hypothesised to either 
correlate positively or negatively with Q.  
Fourth, due to greater political costs, stronger financial strength and greater agency 
problems, larger corporations are likely to maintain better CG regime, and may receive higher Q 
(Beiner et al., 2006). By contrast, smaller firms tend to have better growth opportunities (Klapper 
and Love (2004). This means smaller firms may have to maintain better CG regimes to be able to 
attract external capital and receive higher Q. Given the mixed literature, we hypothesise a 
positive or negative firm size (LNTA)-Q association. Fifth, firms that cross-list on foreign stock 
markets tend to have better CG structures, as they can be subjected to additional CG rules, and 
may generate higher Q (Black et al., 2006a). Thus, a positive cross-listing (CROSLIST)-Q 
relationship is hypothesised.  
Sixth, auditor independence and audit quality are positively associated with audit firm 
size (DeAngelo, 1981). This implies that corporations audited by large and reputable audit firms 
may generate higher Q. Hence, we predict a positive audit firm size (BIG4)-Q nexus. Finally, in 
line with prior studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008), we predict that Q will differ across 
different industries and financial years. As such, we introduce 5 dummies for the 5 remaining 
industries: basic materials and oil & gas (BMAT); consumer goods (CGOODS); consumer 
services and health care (CSERVICES); industrials (INDUST); and technology & 
telecommunications (TECHN); and year dummies for the financial years 2002 to 2007 inclusive. 
Following prior research, and assuming that all relations are linear, our main OLS regression 
equation to be estimated is: 
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where: Q refers to Tobin‟s Q; CGI is the SA CG index; and CONTROLS refers to the control 
variables for growth (GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), gearing (GEAR), firm size 
(LNTA), cross-listing (CROSLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), and industry (INDUST) and year (YD) 
dummies. 
 The following section presents and discusses the univariate and multivariate results. 
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Empirical results: descriptive statistics and univariate regression analysis 
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of all variables included in our regression analysis. It 
shows that our Q ranges from a minimum of .15 to a maximum of 7.98 with an average of 1.55. 
This indicates wide variation in the financial performance of our sampled corporations. Our 
alternative financial performance proxies, namely TSR and ROA, as well as the CGI and the SCGI 
also show wide standard deviations. For example, the CGI suggests that the scores range from a 
minimum of 6% (i.e., 3 out of 50) to a maximum of 98% (i.e., 49 out of 50) with the average 
corporation complying with 61% of the 50 CG provisions analysed. This suggests that a high 
degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance SA listed corporations attach to 
internal CG structures.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1 also indicates that, on average, compliance with the SCGI (which contains 9 SA 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions) are higher than the CGI. For 
example, the median corporation in our sample complied with 78% of the SCGI compared with 
                                                 
6
It takes time for good CG practices to be reflected in corporate financial performance (Weir et al., 2002; Ntim, 2009; Ntim et al., 2011b). 
Therefore, to avoid endogenous association between CG and corporate performance, we introduce a one year lag between CG and corporate 
financial performance such that a corporation‟s financial performance in any year (Qt) depends on the previous year‟s corporate governance (CGt-1) 
structure, similar to Weir et al. (2002) and Ntim and Osei (2011).  
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64% for the CGI. As will be discussed further, this development may be explained by political 
cost and resource independence theories. The control variables all have wide spreads. Generally, 
and unlike prior studies, the large standard deviations observed imply that the CG provisions and 
the sampled firms have been adequately selected to achieve sufficient variation. This reduces the 
possibilities of sample selection bias that have arguably plagued much of the prior cross-country 
studies whose samples include SA (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009).  
We initially use OLS regression technique to test all our hypotheses. As a result, OLS 
assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity are 
tested. The multicollinearity assumption is tested by conducting Pearson parametric and 
Spearman non-parametric correlation analyses among the variables. The results, which for 
brevity not reported, but available upon request, indicated that no serious non-normality and 
multicollinearity problems remain. In addition, we examined scatter, P-P and Q-Q plots, 
studentised residuals, Cook‟s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics. They also indicated no 
serious violation of the OLS assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, normality and 
autocorrelation, respectively.    
 
5.2. Empirical results: OLS (multivariate) regression analysis 
Table 2 reports OLS regression results of Q on the CGI. Column 3 of Table 2 first 
presents the results of a simple regression of Q on the CGI only, whilst columns 4 to 8 contain 
the results of a regression of Q on the CGI and the control variables for the pooled sample in 
addition to a regression for each firm-year, respectively. As hypothesised, Column 3 of Table 2 
shows that the CGI is positive (.006) and statistically significant. However, the significant 
coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 2 seems to suggest that there may be 
omitted variables bias. Therefore, to control for potential omitted variables bias, the control 
variables are added to the regressions in columns 4 to 8 of Table 2.  
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Insert Table 2 about here 
Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on the CGI remains significant and positive 
over the entire sample period. This implies that investors reward SA listed corporations that show 
higher standards of CG with higher financial performance. Specifically, the results can be 
interpreted as a one standard deviation improvement in the average corporation‟s CGI score from 
61% to 80%, can be expected to be associated with an increase in its average Q by about 11% (19 
x .006) from 1.55 to 1.72, ceteris paribus. Our results generally offer support to those of prior 
studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008), but specifically to those of past cross-country studies 
whose samples include SA (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009).  
The coefficients on the control variables in the lower part of Columns 4 to 8 of Table 2 
generally show the predicted signs. For example, and as hypothesised CROSLIST and GROWTH 
are positive and significantly associated with Q, while the coefficient on LNTA is negative and 
significantly related to Q over the entire sample period. In line with the results of Henry (2008), 
the coefficient on the year dummies are significant, indicating that Q differs over time, but the 
insignificant coefficients on the industry dummies except the consumer services companies do 
not support the results of Beiner et al. (2006). Finally, the F-values in Table 2 always reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients on the CGI and control variables are equal to zero. The 
adjusted R
2
 indicates that the CGI can explain at least 6% to 41% of the variations in the sampled 
firms‟ Q with or without the control variables. 
As has been explained above, the uniqueness of our CGI is that it incorporates 9 SA 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions (see section 5 of Appendix). 
These issues are of great importance within the SA corporate context. There is an on-going policy 
debate as to whether given the voluntary CG regime, SA listed corporations will voluntarily 
comply with these CG provisions (Spisto, 2005; West, 2009). However, there are mixed 
theoretical positions regarding the impact that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions will 
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have on corporate financial performance. Stakeholder theorists (Kakabadse and Korac-
Kakabadse, 2002; LSE, 2007) suggest that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions imposes 
additional financial costs on listed corporations.  
In contrast, political cost (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) and resources dependence 
(Pfeffer, 1973) theories indicate that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions does not only 
help in reducing political costs (such as taxation, regulation and nationalisation), but also offer 
greater access to resources (like tax holidays and profitable government contracts). To investigate 
the impact of complying with stakeholder CG provisions on corporate financial performance, we 
form a sub-index defined as SCGI containing 9 SA affirmative action and stakeholder CG issues. 
We hypothesise a significant association between the SCGI and Q, but given the mixed literature, 
we do not specify the direction of the coefficient. 
Table 3 contains OLS regression results of Q on the SCGI. Column 3 of Table 3 first 
reports the results of a simple regression of Q on the SCGI alone, whereas columns 4 to 8 present 
the results of a regression of Q on the SCGI and the control variables for the full sample in 
addition to a regression for each firm-year, respectively. Column 3 of Table 3 shows that the 
coefficient on the SCGI is positive (.002) and statistically significant. The coefficient on the 
constant term in column 3 of Table 3 is, however, significant, which implies that there may be 
omitted variables bias. As a result, to test that whether the positive relationship between the SCGI 
and Q is spuriously caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are added to the 
regressions in columns 4 to 8 of Table 3.   
Insert Table 3 about here 
The coefficient on the SCGI remains significant and positive over the entire sample period. 
This implies that, on average, corporations that comply better with the SCGI tend to be associated 
with higher financial performance. The results also offer empirical support to political cost and 
resource dependence theories. Within the SA context, apart from being part of King II and the 
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JSE‟s listing rules, some of the stakeholder provisions, such as employment equity (EE) and 
black economic empowerment (BEE) are backed by statutory legislation. There are also 
occasional implicit threats from government (political cost) of its intentions to introduce more 
stringent laws if corporations do not voluntarily comply (Rossouw et al., 2002; West, 2006, 
2009). This implies that listed corporations, and especially large companies, are more likely to 
voluntarily comply with the SCGI in order to minimise potential political costs.  
Crucially, and of a particular relevance to basic materials and technology corporations, 
securing and renewing profitable government and mining contracts, for instance, are normally 
linked to satisfying BEE and EE targets (Murray, 2000; Malherbe and Segal, 2003). This means 
that compliance with the SCGI may be a major way by which firms can gain access to valuable 
resources that can facilitate growth and improve long-term financial performance. This seems to 
serve as a major additional motivation for corporations to voluntarily comply with the SCGI, and 
hence, appears to explain the positive association between the SCGI and Q. 
Finally, the coefficients on the control variables in Columns 4 to 8 of Table 3 remain very 
similar to those reported in column 4 of Table 2. The F-values in Table 3 consistently reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients on the SCGI are jointly equal to zero. The adjusted R
2
 
(between 6% and 41%) suggests that the SCGI can explain variations in financial performance 
with or without the control variables. 
 
6. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
Our reported results so far ignore the existence of alternative financial performance proxies, CG 
weighting scheme and estimation technique. The positive link between our CGI and Q, for 
example, could be misleading. In this section, we examine how robust or sensitive our results are 
to the presence of alternative corporate financial performance proxies, CG weighting scheme and 
firm-level fixed-effects. 
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 First, we investigate how robust or sensitive our results are to two alternative financial 
performance proxies: total share returns (TSR – a market based measure) and return on assets 
(ROA – an accounting based proxy). Like Tobin‟s Q, these financial performance measures have 
been used widely within the CG literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Guest, 
2009), and as such considered reliable. Table 4 reports regression results based on the alternative 
financial performance proxies, CG weights and estimation technique. Columns 3 and 4 contain 
OLS regression results of TSR on the CGI without and with the control variables, respectively. 
Columns 5 and 6 do similarly for the ROA, respectively. Our results show that the coefficients on 
the CGI in Columns 3 to 6 remain positive and statistically significant. This indicates that our 
results are robust whether a market (TSR) or an accounting (ROA) based measure of financial 
performance is used. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 Second, and similar to Beiner et al. (2006), we examine whether our results depend on the 
weighting of the 5 sections of our CGI. As the Appendix shows, our CGI contains 50 CG 
provisions based on 5 broad sections of King II. As has been explained in section 4, all 50 
provisions forming the CGI are equally weighted, but the number of provisions varies across the 
5 sections. Thus, this simple equal weighting scheme results in different weights being assigned 
to each of the 5 sections: (1) board, directors, and ownership (54%); accounting and auditing 
(12%), risk management, internal audit and control (10%); integrated sustainability reporting 
(18%); and compliance and enforcement (6%). To ascertain whether our results are robust or 
sensitive to equal weighting of the 5 sections, we construct an alternative CGI, defined as 
Weighted-CGI, in which each of the 5 sections is awarded a weight of 20%. Consistent with the 
findings of Beiner et al. (2006), our results reported in Columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 indicate that 
the coefficients of the Weighted-CGI are positive and significant, suggesting that our results are 
robust to this alternative weighting scheme. 
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 Finally, corporations tend to differ in their opportunities and challenges that they 
encounter over time. This can result in a situation where CG and corporate financial performance 
are jointly determined by unobserved firm-specific variables (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009), which 
simple OLS regressions may be unable to capture. Thus, given the panel nature of our data and in 
line with Henry (2008) and Guest (2009), we estimate a fixed-effects model to account for 
endogeneity problems that may arise from the existence of possible unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity. We do this by re-estimating equation (1), in which we introduce 168 dummies to 
represent the 169 sampled corporations. Our fixed-effects results contained in Column 9 of Table 
4 show that the coefficient on the CGI remains positive and significant, an indication that our 
results are robust to potential endogeneity problems that may arise from the presence of possible 
unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. Overall, the results from our robustness or sensitivity tests 
generally support our previous conclusion that better-governed SA corporations tend to be 
significantly associated with higher financial performance. 
   
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A number of papers have examined the relationship between a broad set of good corporate 
governance (CG) practices and corporate financial performance. Most of the studies have 
concentrated on the developed and emerging stock markets of America, Asia-Pacific and Europe. 
This leaves a conspicuous gap within the extant CG literature with respect to evidence regarding 
African stock markets. However, some African countries, and in particular, South Africa (SA) 
offer interesting research context. Unlike most African countries, SA has a matured corporate 
sector, deep equity culture, and strong regulatory and CG framework comparable to those of 
developed and other established emerging stock markets.  
In this paper, we have attempted to fill this gap in the existing literature by investigating 
the association between a broad set of good CG practices and financial performance using a 
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sample of 169 SA listed corporations from 2002 to 2007 and 50 CG provisions based on the 2002 
King Report (King II). First, we find a significant and positive link between good CG practices 
(CGI) and Tobin‟s Q (Q). This implies that better-governed SA corporations tend to be 
associated with higher financial performance. We show that our evidence is robust to 
endogeneity, accounting and market based firm value proxies, alternative CG index weighting 
scheme and unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. 
Second, a distinctive feature of the SA CG framework is that it formally imposes 
substantial affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions on listed corporations to comply 
with. This allows us to uniquely analyse the relationship between complying with stakeholder CG 
provisions (SCGI) and the financial performance of SA listed corporations. Our results show that 
SA corporations that comply better with the stakeholder CG provisions tend to be associated with 
higher financial performance. The results offer empirical support to political cost and resource 
dependence theories. Within the SA corporate context, compliance with stakeholder CG 
provisions appears to be a major way by which listed corporations can reduce political costs (like 
regulation, taxation, and nationalisation) and also gain access to resources (such as tax holidays 
and profitable government contracts) to facilitate growth and improve long-term financial 
performance.  
Third, our results have important policy implications. The prior literature suggests that 
good CG framework is crucial to corporate success. Our results show that the investors reward 
corporations with better CG practices with higher financial performance. As an emerging market, 
good CG practices are particularly important as this may not only help reduce corporate failures, 
but may also help companies to attract foreign direct investments. This may facilitate faster 
economic growth and development in SA. In this respect, efforts by the Institute of Directors of 
SA, the King Committee, and the JSE at improving CG standards in SA companies is laudable. 
The significant positive relationship between the SCGI and financial performance implies that SA 
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listed corporations may need to pay serious attention to complying with the affirmative action 
and stakeholder provisions and also in preparing the integrated sustainability report. Finally, 
whilst our findings are important, some caveats are in order. We use binary coding scheme which 
treats every CG mechanism as equally important. Whilst results based on our equally weighted 
CGI and the alternatively weighted index are essentially similar, future studies may improve 
results by constructing weighted and un-weighted indices. 
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Appendix: Full List of the SA Corporate Governance Index Provisions Based on King II 
 
Section 1: Board, directors and ownership 
 
1. Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO/MD are split. 
2. Whether the chairperson of the board is independent non-executive directors. 
3. Whether the board is composed by a majority of non-executive directors (NEDs). 
4. Whether the board meets at least 4 times in a year. 
5. Whether individual directors‟ meetings record is disclosed. 
6. Whether directors are clearly classified into executive, NED, and independent. 
7. Whether chairperson‟s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and disclosed. 
8. Whether CEO/MD‟s performance and effectiveness is appraised and disclosed. 
9. Whether the board‟s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and disclosed.  
 25 
 
 
10. Whether the board subcommittees‟ performance and effectiveness is evaluated. 
11. Whether directors‟ biography, experience and responsibilities are disclosed. 
12. Whether a policy that prohibits directors, officers and employees (insider) share dealings 
around the release of price sensitive information is disclosed. 
13. The existence of the office of company secretary. 
14. Whether a nomination committee has been established. 
15. Whether the nomination committee consists of a majority independent NEDs. 
16. Whether the chairperson of the nomination committee is an independent NED. 
17. Whether the membership of the nomination committee is disclosed. 
18. Whether the nomination committee‟s members‟ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
19. Whether a remuneration committee has been established. 
20. Whether the remuneration committee is constituted entirely by independent NEDs. 
21. Whether the chairperson of the remuneration committee is an independent NEDs. 
22. Whether the membership of the remuneration committee is disclosed. 
23. Whether the remuneration committee‟s members‟ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
24. Whether directors‟ remuneration, interests, and share options are disclosed. 
25. Whether director remuneration philosophy and procedure is disclosed. 
26. Whether directors‟ have access to free independent professional legal advice. 
27.  Whether share ownership by directors and officers (internal share ownership) is less than 
50% of the total company shareholdings. 
 
Section 2: Accounting and auditing 
 
28. Whether an audit committee has been established. 
29. Whether the audit committee is constituted by at least 2 independent NEDs with 
significant professional financial training and experience. 
30. Whether the chairperson of the audit committee is an independent NED. 
31. Whether the membership of the audit committee is disclosed. 
32. Whether the audit committee‟s members‟ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
33. Whether a board statement on the going-concern status of the firm is disclosed. 
 
Section 3: Risk management, internal audit and control 
 
34. Whether a risk management committee has been established. 
35. Whether the risk committee‟s members‟ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
36. Whether a narrative on both actual and potential future systematic and non-systematic 
risks is disclosed. 
37. Whether a narrative (policy) on existing internal control systems (including internal audit) 
is disclosed. 
38. Whether narrative (policy) on how current and future assessed company risks will be 
managed is disclosed. 
 
Section 4: Integrated sustainability reporting (non-financial information) 
 
39. Whether a narrative (policy) on how a firm is complying with and implementing the 
broad-based black economic empowerment and empowerment of women laws is 
disclosed. 
40. Whether a narrative (policy) on how a firm is complying with and implementing 
employment equity laws in terms of gender, age, ethnicity and disabilities is disclosed. 
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41. Whether a narrative (policy) on how a firm is addressing the threat posed by HIV/AIDS 
pandemic in South Africa is disclosed. 
42. Whether a narrative (policy) on measures taken by a firm to address occupational health 
and safety of its employees is disclosed. 
43. Whether a narrative (policy) on how a firm is complying with and implementing rules and 
regulations on the environment is disclosed.  
44. Whether a narrative (policy) on the existence of a code of ethics is disclosed. 
45. Whether a firm‟s board is formed by at least 1 white and 1 non-white (board diversity on 
the basis of ethnicity) person. 
46. Whether a firm‟s board is formed by at least 1 male and 1 female (board diversity on the 
basis of gender) person. 
47. Whether a narrative (policy) on community support and other corporate social 
investments or responsibilities is disclosed. 
 
Section 5: Encouraging a culture of voluntary compliance and enforcement 
 
48. Whether a positive statement on the compliance or non-compliance with the corporate 
governance provisions of King II is disclosed. 
49. Whether a narrative (policy) on how a firm is contributing towards the development of 
financial journalism is disclosed. 
50. Whether a narrative (policy) on what a firm is doing to encourage shareholder activism, 
like having investor relations department and proxy voting is disclosed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of all continuous variables for all (845) firm years 
Variable  Mean  Median         Std. dev.       Maximum           Minimum 
Financial Performance Variables 
Q     1.55    1.33   .91             7.98       .15  
ROA       .09      .11   .20    .87               -2.40  
TSR       .39      .30            1.02             22.00                 -.98 
Corporate Governance Variables 
CGI       .61      .64   .19    .98       .06 
SCGI       .69      .78   .27  1.00       .00 
Control Variables 
GROWTH      .20      .13   .91           22.36               -1.00 
CAPEX      .15      .06   .52  9.90       .00 
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GEAR       .67      .15            5.91           15.53       .00 
LNTA     5.95    5.97   .91  8.01                3.25 
CGCOM      .32      .00   .47  1.00                  .00 
BIG4       .73    1.00   .44  1.00       .00 
CROSLIST      .22      .00   .41  1.00       .00 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Tobin‟s Q (Q), measured as the ratio of total assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity to total assets. Return on assets (ROA), calculated as the ratio of operating profit 
to total assets. Total share returns (TSR), defined as the total share returns made up of share price and dividends. 
South African corporate governance index (CGI), refers to a corporate governance (CG) index containing 50 
provisions in King II that takes a value of 1 if each of the 50 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a 
value between 0% and 100%. Social CGI (SCGI), which is a sub-index of the CGI containing 9 SA context specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions that form the CGI. Sales growth (GROWTH), measured as the 
ratio of the current year‟s sales minus last year‟s sales to last year‟s sales. Capital expenditure (CAPEX), calculated 
as the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. Gearing (GEAR), estimated as the ratio of total debt to market 
value of equity.  Firm size (LNTA), calculated as the natural log of total assets. CG committee (CGCOM), measured 
as a dummy variable that takes that value of 1 if a firm has set up a CG committee, 0 otherwise. Audit firm size 
(BIG4), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.  Cross-listing (CROSLIST), 
defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is cross-listed on foreign stock markets, 0 otherwise.  
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Table 2. OLS regression results of Q on the CGI and control variables 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years All firm years 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
Sample size (N) 
     .061 
    .658 
  1.985 
11.004(.000)
*** 
845 
    .411 
    .434 
  2.168 
14.545(.000)
*** 
845 
    .316 
    .502 
  2.089 
  6.438(.000)
*** 
169 
   .243 
   .524 
 2.142 
3.504(.000)
*** 
169 
   .218 
   .635 
 2.112 
 3.486(.000)
*** 
169 
   .258 
   .496 
 2.185 
 4.978(.000)
*** 
169 
Constant 
CGI 
BIG4 
CAPEX 
CROSLIST 
LNTA 
GEAR 
GROWTH 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
Year 2007 
 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
 
.864(.000)
***
 
.006(.000)
***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .549(.000)
***
 
 .003(.005)
***
 
 .062(.156) 
 .000(.757) 
 .100(.038)
**
 
-.093(.002)
***
 
 .000(.744) 
 .001(.008)
***
 
 .046(.430) 
 .212(.000)
***
 
 .042(.452) 
 .059(.366) 
 .193(.000)
***
 
 .224(.000)
***
 
 .268(.000)
*** 
 .296(.000)
***
 
 .442(.000)
***
 
 .002(.028)
**
 
 .164(.182) 
 .012(.426) 
 .214(.004)
*** 
-.046(.045)
**
 
 .001(.539) 
 .036(.026)
**
 
  .237(.241) 
 .358(.026)
**
 
 .055(.360) 
 .152(.324) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .386(.000)
***
 
 .004(.000)
***
 
 .152(.423) 
 .008(.672) 
 .164(.048)
**
 
-.082(.050)
**
 
 .002(.294) 
 .005(.012)
**
 
 .126(.348) 
 .435(.014)
** 
 .087(.165) 
 .240(.386) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .648(.000)
***
 
 .007(.000)
***
 
 .085(.327) 
 .004(.586) 
 .143(.008)
***
 
-.110(.016)
**
 
 .000(.149) 
 .009(.098)
*
 
 .188(.284) 
 .546(.028)
**
 
 .129(.278) 
 .283(.426) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .524(.000)
***
 
 .008(.000)
***
 
 .132(.458) 
 .038(.085)
*
 
 .194(.000)
***
 
-.041(.084)
*
 
 .001(.193) 
 .007(.086)
*
 
 .259(.391) 
 .651(.032)
**
 
 .148(.561) 
 .384(.263) 
- 
- 
- 
  - 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate that p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The consumer goods industry and year 
2003 are captured by the constant term in the pooled analysis. Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using the robust clustered standard errors technique. Variables are 
defined as follows: Tobin‟s Q (Q), South African corporate governance index (CGI), audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPEX), cross-listing (CROSLIST), firm size 
(LNTA), gearing (GEAR) and growth (GROWTH). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 3. OLS regression results of Q on the SCGI and control variables 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All Firm Years All Firm Years 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
Sample size (N) 
     .059 
    .676 
  1.963 
10.248(.000)
*** 
845 
    .408 
    .436 
  2.125 
12.820(.000)
*** 
845 
    .232 
    .568 
  2.042 
  5.602(.000)
*** 
169 
   .165 
   .593 
 2.014 
3.938(.000)
*** 
169 
   .138 
   .625 
 2.002 
 4.385(.000)
*** 
169 
   .248 
   .629 
 2.103 
 4.850(.000)
*** 
169 
Constant 
SCGI 
BIG4 
CAPEX 
CROSLIST 
LNTA 
GEAR 
GROWTH 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Technology 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
Year 2007 
 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
 
.785(.000)
***
 
.002(.000)
***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .472(.002)
***
 
 .001(.046)
**
 
 .080(.066)
*
 
 .000(.648) 
 .108(.025)
**
 
-.061(.028)
**
 
 .000(.587) 
 .001(.024)
**
 
  .035(.547) 
 .221(.000)
***
 
 .056(.318) 
 .068(.301) 
 .212(.008)
***
 
 .261(.000)
***
 
 .283(.000)
***
  
 .300(.000)
***
 
 .367(.089)
*
 
 .004(.062)
*
 
 .384(.254) 
 .000(.692) 
 .139(.094)
* 
-.002(.085)
*
 
 .000(.631) 
 .000(.038)
**
 
 .429(.363) 
 .208(.042)
**
 
 .063(.428) 
 .090(.507) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .438(.029)
**
 
 .001(.095)
*
 
 .114(.326) 
 .008(.412) 
 .014(.086)
*
 
-.098(.070)
*
 
 .000(.456) 
 .048(.065)
*
 
 .405(.420) 
 .532(.045)
** 
 .061(.478) 
 .328(.612) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .325(.092)
*
 
 .003(.081)
*
 
 .045(.468) 
 .000(.457) 
 .158(.046)
**
 
-.102(.028)
**
 
 .000(.562) 
 .001(.088)
*
 
 .628(.431) 
 .409(.049)
**
 
 .321(.630) 
 .417(.496) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .434(.000)
***
 
 .003(.000)
***
 
 .205(.514) 
 .051(.097)
*
 
 .186(.000)
***
 
-.075(.093)
*
 
 .000(.630) 
 .009(.076)
*
 
 .440(.530) 
 .568(.069)
*
 
 .608(.524) 
 .490(.515) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate that p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The consumer goods industry and year 
2003 are captured by the constant term in the pooled analysis. Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using the robust clustered standard errors technique. Variables are 
defined as follows: Tobin‟s Q (Q), Social-CGI (SCGI), audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPEX), cross-listing (CROSLIST), firm size (LNTA), gearing (GEAR) and 
growth (GROWTH). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 4. Regression results based on alternative financial performance proxies, weighted CG index and fixed-effects estimation 
  Alternative Financial Performance proxies Alternatively Weighted CGI Fixed-effects 
 
 
Exp. 
Sign 
Total Share Returns 
(TSR) 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Tobin’s Q 
(Q) 
Tobin’s Q 
(Q) 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
Sample size (N) 
   .036 
  .474 
1.518 
3.314(.000)
*** 
845 
  .198 
  .433 
2.150 
3.909(.000)
***
 
845 
  .048
 
  .113 
1.935 
4.124(.000)
***
 
845 
  .315 
  .108 
2.104 
8.856(.000)
***
 
845 
  .025 
  .654 
1.428 
1.802(.096)
* 
845 
  .138 
  .436 
2.112 
2.678(.086)
*
 
845 
  .590 
  .389 
2.243 
9.306(.000)
*** 
845 
Constant 
CGI 
Weighted-CGI 
BIG4 
CAPEX 
CROSLIST 
LNTA 
GEAR 
GROWTH 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
Year 2007 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
-.010(.871) 
 .005(.000)
***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .204(.165) 
 .004(.007)
***
 
- 
-.024(.589) 
-.002(.100)
*
 
 .004(.935) 
-.046(.125) 
 .000(.350) 
 .003(.000)
***
 
-.006(.916) 
 .086(.131) 
 .138(.013)
**
 
-.107(.100)
*
 
 .118(.015)
**
 
 .204(.000)
***
 
 .348(.000)
*** 
 .495(.000)
***
 
-.022(.127) 
 .006(.000)
***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .035(.218) 
 .004(.009)
**
 
- 
 .009(.281) 
-.000(.699) 
 .007(.065)
*
 
-.007(.058)
* 
-.015(.009)
***
 
 .000(.341) 
-.022(.044)
**
 
 .008(.495) 
 .000(.943) 
 .008(.505) 
-.013(.160) 
 .006(.563) 
 .003(.799) 
- 
.028(.264) 
- 
.004(.010)
***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .424(.627) 
- 
 .003(.008)
**
 
 .082(.059)
*
 
 .000(.661) 
 .112(.020)
**
 
-.051(.036)
**
 
 .000(.529) 
 .000(.218) 
 .039(.505) 
 .229(.062)
*
 
 .063(.254) 
 .077(.237) 
 .098(.054)
*
 
 .306(.000)
***
 
 .268(.000)
*** 
- 
 .725(.019)
**
 
 .004(.006)
***
 
- 
 .058(.656) 
-.002(.437) 
-.010(.917) 
-.062(.098)
*
 
 .001(.255) 
 .001(.091)
*
 
 .073(.103) 
 .324(.083)
*
 
 .216(.385) 
 .284(.529) 
 .209(.000)
***
 
 .388(.000)
***
 
 .456(.000)
*** 
- 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate that p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The consumer goods industry and year 
2003 are captured by the constant term in the pooled analysis. Following Petersen (2009), coefficients are estimated by using the robust clustered standard errors technique. Variables are 
defined as follows: Tobin‟s Q (Q), South African corporate governance index (CGI), Weighted CGI (Weighted-CGI), audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPEX), cross-
listing (CROSLIST), firm size (LNTA), gearing (GEAR) and growth (GROWTH). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
 
 
 
 
